We consider a single-period nancial market model with normally distributed returns and the presence of heterogeneous agents. Specically, some investors are classical Expected Utility maximizers whereas some others follow Cumulative Prospect Theory. Using well-known functional forms for the preferences, we analytically prove that a Security Market Line Theorem holds. This implies that Capital Asset Pricing Model is a necessary (though not sucient) requirement in equilibria with positive prices. We correct some erroneous results about existence of equilibria with Cumulative Prospect Theory investors which had appeared in the last few years and we give sucient conditions for an equilibrium to exist. To circumvent the complexity arising from the interaction of heterogeneous agents, we propose a segmented-market equilibrium model where segmentation is endogenously determined.
Introduction
Since the early works of Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), several attempts have been made in order to extend this model to more general specications of the investors' preferences. While CAPM ts well for Expected Utility (EU) maximizers, especially those who decide accordingly to the Mean-Variance (MV) principle, it is quite problematic to deal with dierent choice paradigms. The essence of the CAPM can be traced back to the Tobin (1958) separation principle, which in turn leads to mutual fund separation and the Security Market Line Theorem (SMLT). Once we check that a separation principle holds, i.e. when traders form their portfolios employing a restricted subset of available securities, then we are on the right way for the CAPM. Even better, if we can aord on a two-fund separation, then we will readily state that a SMLT holds. In other words, investors focus exclusively on two distinct assets; the mixture of the two gives the selected nancial position.
Now, it is well-known under what conditions a two-fund separation principle holds for EU op-
timizers; see for example Ingersoll (1987) . Briey, we can use special forms of the utility functions and/or we can impose restrictions over the probabilistic distribution of the security payos. Loosely speaking, MV and normal distributions are the most synthetic, appealing and friendly ways to have a SMLT. However, if we leave the EU paradigm, fund separation and the SMLT must be proved again.
To circumvent the main diculties, it is often assumed that the agents who people the economy are endowed with preferences that can be represented via handy functionals. Surprisingly, for particular choices of such functionals and assuming normal distributions, the MV criterion continues to hold and the CAPM can be restored. This idea is not new to the literature; see for example Barberis and Huang (2008) and De Giorgi, Hens and Levy (2011) . In our work, we exploit a similar reasoning using Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) preferences.
In Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , the authors provided the rst axiomatization of CPT, an improved version of the earlier Prospect Theory (see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ) that erroneously accounted for violations of rst-order stochastic dominance. The cornerstones of CPT are:
-people evaluate gains or losses, that is to say departures of the terminal wealth with respect to a reference point (RP);
-the utility function, or value function, is concave for gains and convex for losses, implying risk aversion (seeking) in the domain of gains (losses);
-individuals are loss averse (LA); in other words, a loss hurts more than an equivalent gain;
-the decision makers assess actual probabilities correctly, but these probabilities are somehow distorted during the evaluation process; not only, the distortions on gains are generally dierent from those on losses.
Thus, the utility function and the distortions are complementary in determining the behavior toward risk. In particular, empirical evidence suggests that people tend to overweight relatively large gains and loss of small probabilities.
The main reason of the success of CPT is that it provides a sound alternative to EU. First, it retains a sucient analytical tractability that allows deep mathematical investigations on portfolio optimization problems (e.g. see Bernard and Ghossoub (2010) and He and Zhou (2011) for a static version of the problem, or Jin and Zhou (2008) for a continuous time model). Secondly, it is more suitable as a descriptive theory of individual choice in risky environments, since it has been developed starting from experimental observations. However, the debate whether actual decision makers follow EU or CPT (or some other choice paradigm) is still open.
On a theoretical ground, we could split up the population of the economy in several pools and classify agents depending on the choice paradigm that suits best for each of them. In this work we consider two pools, namely that of EU maximizers and that of CPT maximizers. In what follows, we will refer to an heterogeneous agents model if traders of both groups interact, while homogeneous agents model means that only one pool is considered. In Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009), the authors study a number of stylized one-period markets populated by heterogeneous agents endowed with the most common preference paradigms used in nance. Their main nding is that even in such a simple setting, the risk premium and the risk-free return are heavily inuenced by heterogeneity. Moreover, the assumption on the presence of a representative agent in heterogeneous models is extremely misleading, since it produces qualitative and quantitative biases. For these reasons, we describe in detail the composition of our pools and our results highlight the implications of heterogeneity.
We remark that in the existing literature it is common to use the word homogeneous when referring to a single group of agents that share the same identical preferences. If those preferences have a specic functional form, it follows that the parameters used to describe them must be the same. On the other hand, heterogeneous often denotes a situation where every decision maker belongs to the same pool but the preference parameters may be dierent. To avoid misunderstandings, we will always specify the pool where the agents come from, EU or CPT, and whether their preferences are identical or not.
In the past few years, the analysis of existence (or non-existence) of equilibria in nancial market with non-EU agents has become an important eld of study. Notably, Barberis and Huang (2008) prove that CAPM necessarily arises if one assumes CPT-homogeneous agents with piecewise-power utility functions, special probability distortions and normally distributed asset payos. Actually, they also claim that an equilibrium with positive prices always exists. On the contrary, in this paper we will show that this result is incorrect since preference parameters can be chosen in such a way that prices become negative.
De Giorgi, Hens and Rieger (2010) show that equilibria may not exist for a pool of CPTheterogeneous traders with piecewise-power utility function and a nite number of states of nature.
The main reason can be found in the discontinuity of the demand function. Besides this, if investors are able to innitely leverage their portfolios, then we can have an ill-posed optimization problem.
However, equilibrium existence is proved when the market is populated by a continuum of agents and non-negativity constraints are imposed on the terminal wealth.
De Giorgi, Hens and Levy (2011) assume normally distributed payos and a special form of rankdependent preferences for a single pool of heterogeneous investors. At rst, the authors show that the portfolio optimization problem is equivalent to a MV one. Then, a SMLT is proved and existence of equilibria is claimed. Regarding these results, we highlight a minor aw in the proof of an inequality that leads to erroneously accept a particular type of probability distortions. Not only, we will see once again that existence of equilibria is assured only if we admit negative prices. Actually, in De Giorgi, Hens and Levy (2011) the denition of market equilibrium admits non-positive prices but it seems to us that strictly positivity of prices should be a must in this type of models.
In the CAPM world, the problem of existence of equilibria and the consequent inspection of the sign of the prices are well-known; see Nielsen (1988) , Allingham (1991) , Nielsen (1992) and M. Levy (2007) . Exactly the same questions arise in non-EU homogeneous agents models and heterogeneous agents models. To avoid further complexity, we sometimes assume the presence of a single risky asset or we focus on a special type of equilibria, namely segmented equilibria.
Market segmentation models appeared soon in nancial modeling and they have been used to describe more realistic scenarios. Generally, a segmented equilibrium is the result of exogenous constraints imposed over market participants. Specically, H. Levy (1978) considers a market where agents are limited on the number of risky assets they can use to form their portfolios. Merton (1987) assumes that each investor includes in her portfolio only a subset of securities, namely those she is informed about. Markowitz (1990) studies a CAPM where traders are constrained by a system of linear equalities and/or inequalities. In Sharpe (1991) , market participants can not take negative positions in assets. However, we distinguish from the preceding literature as we provide sucient conditions for the existence of a segmented equilibrium that arises endogenously in the model. Thus, we can classify traders in two groups, namely those who participate to the risky market and those who invest all their wealth in the risk-free asset.
As it happens in actual advanced economies, there is a surprisingly high percentage of households who stay out of the stock market. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) However, they do not conrm a signicant relationship between LA and investment in equity.
We nally remark that we aim at studying theoretical properties of equilibria. We are not interested in the calibration of our models, nor we want to provide normative prescriptions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the main assumptions of the model, namely the market structure and the preferences of the investors. Next, in Section 3 we show that CAPM is the necessary model that arises in equilibrium, even though an equilibrium needs not to exist. We analyze segmented equilibria in Section 4, also providing explicit sucient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Section 5 is devoted to the study of an endogenous risk-free return model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider a single-period nancial market, where in t = 0 investment decisions are made and in t = 1 consumption of the realized prots takes place. The uncertainty underlying our market will be modeled through a given probability space (Ω, F , P), where the random variable Y : Ω → R represents a nancial position. E[Y ] will denote the expectation of the r.v. Y with respect to P, while Cov(Y, Z) will be the covariance between Y and Z.
Assumption 1 (Market structure). There are N + 1 traded assets in a frictionless market without constraints.
-Asset 0 is the risk-free asset which pays 1 unit of currency in every state of the world; its exogenous rate of return is r and it is in elastic supply.
-Assets 1, . . . , N are non-redundant risky securities, whose per-share payo is given by a multivariate normal r.v.
is positively dened. The exogenous supply of the risky assets is S = (S 1 , . . . , S N ) ∈ R N ++
.
1 R N ++ is short notation for (0, +∞) N . In this case, we mean that every asset is in strictly positive supply.
We set the price of the risk-less asset as q 0 :=
1+r
, whereas q = (q 1 , . . . , q N ) will denote the prices of the N stocks to be determined in equilibrium. Portfolios are obtained through investment in the N + 1 securities and as usual we can consider the market portfolio M = D S, that is the sum of all available assets. Immediately, we compute the expected payo, the variance and the price of M as
We model heterogeneity in our economy assuming that it is populated by two distinct pools of investors, also called traders or agents. Those who belong to the rst group, I, are classical EU investors, whereas the other pool, H, contains a special class of CPT agents. Specically we make the following hypotheses.
Assumption 2 (Investor endowments). Each investor receives an initial wealth W j > 0, j ∈ I ∪ H, in the form of traded assets.
Assumption 3 (EU preferences). I is the (possibly empty) set of EU traders, with I := #I ≥ 0. The i-th agent, i = 1, . . . , I, evaluates her random terminal wealth
where u i : R → R is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice dierentiable utility function.
Note that Assumptions 1 and 3 taken together imply that EU investors respect the MV principle.
Assumption 4 (CPT-MV preferences). H is the (possibly empty) set of CPT-MV traders, with H := #H ≥ 0. The h-th agent, h = 1, . . . , H, evaluates her random terminal wealth
where (i) u h : R → R is strictly increasing, convex on (−∞, 0), concave on (0, +∞), twice dierentiable on R \ {0} with u h (0) = 0;
(ii) w 
The previous assumption captures the main points 2 of CPT as originally formulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In particular, (i) reects the typical S-shaped (convex-concave) utility function. Property (ii) models the probability distortions (or weighting functions) of our investors; note that we do not restrict ourselves to reversed S-shaped (concave-convex) w h ± as empirically observed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . In (iii), we introduce the reference point RP h as the level which distinguishes a loss (X 3 In Section 5 we will remove this assumption and the risk-less return will be determined endogenously.
such a case, a return over (below) 1 + r is regarded as a gain (loss). Finally, Property (iv) imposes a link on the choice of the utility function and the probability distortions. We remark that a negative dependence of U h in the variance is needed only if the expected variation of wealth is positive. In order to see that Property (iv) is not a too severe constraint, we provide the following lemma. Lemma 1 (Cases of CPT-MV preferences). The following specications fulll Property (iv) of Assumption 4.
with α
(ii)
where λ
is non negative, strictly increasing and concave on (0, +∞) and f
where
Proof. 
where α h ∈ (0, 1) and λ h,− > λ h,+ > 0 implies LA for large payos. This particular form is also studied in Köbberling and Wakker (2006) and it closely approximate the piecewise-power utility around zero for α h = 0.2, λ h,+ = 6.52 and λ h,− = 14.7, as De Giorgi, Hens and Levy (2011) show. However, these authors erroneously state that the weighting function w dened in equation (3) satises w (p) < λw (1 − p) for p ∈ (0.5, 1) as long as λ > 1 and δ > 0.28. As a matter of fact, in the proof of their Lemma 2 there is a miscalculation. The correct expression should be:
For p ∈ (0.5, 1) the rst addend in (7) is positive, whereas the second one is negative. Hence, for suitable choices of λ and δ the inequality z(p, λ, δ) > 0 does not hold for all p ∈ (0.5, 1), as Figure  1 shows. In the left panel we set λ = 2.25 and in the right panel we xed δ = 0.65. Plotting an Figure 1 : The gure shows that the probability distortions w introduced in (3) do not always satisfy z(p, λ, δ) > 0 for p ∈ (0.5, 1), λ > 1 and δ ∈ (0.28, 1) (the function z is dened in (7)). In the left panel, we xed λ = 2.25 and in the right panel we xed δ = 0.65. The horizontal grid is plotted at z = 0.
horizontal grid at level z = 0, we see that low acceptable values of δ as well as low acceptable values of λ can cause a violation of the desired inequality.
Case (iii) is called Linear LA; note that it ignores probability distortions. Once again, λ h captures LA in its easiest (and clearest) way.
To conclude this section, we specify how our investors form their portfolios. Let j ∈ I ∪ H and let θ j = (θ 
Recalling that a CPT-MV investor evaluates the changes in wealth, we set ∆X 
CAPM as a necessary condition in equilibrium
Assumptions 1 and 4-(iv) are very strong but extremely helpful in nding some necessary conditions that must hold in equilibrium. Before giving a formal denition of an equilibrium, we recall that for a MV investor the solution to her portfolio optimization problem will lie on the MV frontier. In other words, it will be a linear combination of the risk-less asset and the tangency portfolio 4 . Not only, equilibrium means that the market must be cleared, hence it is necessary for the tangency portfolio to be the market portfolio M . Moreover, the aggregate demand for M must be suciently high for all the shares of each security to be purchased. By itself, this fact does not imply that anyone must express positive demand for M . However, the economy as a whole has to re-allocate the endowments to exactly clear the market. We now use mathematics to translate these facts.
Denition 1 (Market equilibrium). An equilibrium is a vector of strictly positive pricesq ∈ R N ++ and allocationsθ
(ii) (Market clearing) givenq,
4 Tangency occurs between the MV frontiers obtained with and without the risk-free asset. In the rst case, it is formed by two straight lines on the mean/standard deviation plane. On the contrary, it is an hyperbola when only risky assets are available; see Ingersoll (1987) .
Assume for the moment that individual optimal portfolios contain the risk-free asset and the market portfolio exclusively. Therefore, to solve the j-th agent's optimization problem we only need to establish the proportion of the market portfolio M that she is willing to acquire. Letting Θ j M be such proportion, we can write the terminal wealth as
and similarly obtain the wealth changes ∆X h . Now it is immediate to see that (1) induces the function
where φ µ,σ is the probability density function (pdf ) of a N (µ, σ) r.v.. Performing a change of variable in (2), we also nd
where Φ µ,σ denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf ) of a N (µ, σ) r.v.. Note that we used the absolute value of Θ h M for the standard deviation in (9) because we admit Θ h M ∈ R, i.e. short selling and taking leverage are allowed. Considering q M ∈ R + as a parameter, the function v Proof. For an EU investor, Assumption 3 on the strict concavity of u i implies that utility maximization has a unique solution. From the First-Order Conditions (FOC) in equation (8), we nd This is because they lead to the same variance but the rst investment has a higher expected return.
Hence, for any given
The meaning of the preceding lemma is that the optimal demand for the market portfolio is non negative if and only if the return of the market portfolio is greater than that of the risk-less asset; for the EU agents we also have strict inequalities. However, for Lemma 2 to be applied we have to prove that the market portfolio is the only risky position undertaken by our investors; but this is true as they all follow the MV criterion. Consequently, we have the following necessary condition.
Lemma 3 (Necessary condition in equilibrium). Under Assumptions 1-4, a market equilibrium in the sense of Denition 1 can exist only if
Proof. The market clearing condition (ii) in Denition 1 becomes
. . , I and h = 1, . . . , H, which violates the previous equality.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 is that the market portfolio M lies on the ecient frontier.
In order to recover more familiar expressions, we compute the returns of the risky securities R := (R 1 , . . . , R N ), where R n = D n /q n . Then, R M := M/q M and R f := 1 + r represent the market return and the risk-free return respectively. Formally, we can summarize our results in a Security Market Line Theorem (SMLT), which is the essence of CAPM. 
Proof. Suppose an equilibrium exists. Then (i) follows immediately from Lemma 3. To obtain (ii), it suces to note that a portfolio whose return is R M + x(R n − R f ) must reach its maximum Sharpe ratio 6 at x = 0, as suggested in Barberis and Huang (2008) .
Equation (10) is the classical linear relation which synthesizes the CAPM. We highlight the fact that if an equilibrium exists, then the positive pricesq give us the returns R, R M and we can check that (10) holds. On the contrary, if we only require (10) to hold, then it is not guaranteed the existence of an equilibrium in the sense of Denition 1. Even worse, we could be able to nd optimal allocations θ j which clear the market but require some negative prices. To better understand how these pathological phenomena arise, we distinguish three cases depending on the population of the market.
Markets with EU investors
Consider the case when our market is populated by solely EU agents, i.e. I>0 and H=0; such a situation is the most common in the literature. Problems concerning the existence of CAPM equilibria with possibly negative prices has already been studied; see Nielsen (1988) , Allingham (1991) , Nielsen (1992) and M. Levy (2007) . Briey, the main cause for the negative prices to arise stands in the non monotonicity of MV preferences. Holding more risky shares causes expected return and variance to rise simultaneously and the overall eect on the expected utility could be negative. Consequently, the aggregate demand is systematically lower than the exogenous supply unless prices become negative, which correspond to a sort of extreme reward for bearing risk. While the aforementioned authors analyze this issue in full generality, we restrict ourselves to the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) case as it allows easier and explicit computations. Namely, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (CARA EU preferences). For i = 1, . . . , I, u
Now it is possible to solve the optimization problem for the i-th trader and then aggregate over i. Nielsen (1992) clearly shows in his Example 2 that the CAPM equilibrium price system is necessarily given byq
where Λ = (
−1 is the harmonic mean of the CARA coecients, also known as the market price of risk. Consequently, prices will be strictly positive if and only if µ − ΛV S ∈ R N ++ . Observe thatq is totally expressed in terms of exogenous parameters and ifq ∈ R N ++ , then the induced price of the market portfolio q M will be positive. However, the contrary is not necessarily true, as some prices could be positive and some others negative or zero.
In the simplest case of a market with one risk-free and one risky asset, we can identify the only security with the market portfolio. The following relations hold:
Hence, in equilibrium there is one price to be determined and it is easy to check whether it is positive.
In particular, the FOC from equation (8) give
6 The Sharpe ratio of a security with expected return µ and standard deviation σ is given by SR :=
and summation over i, together with the market clearing condition, yields the equilibrium pricē
which is positive if and only if Λ <
. In such a case, the equilibrium allocations will bē
. . , I.
Markets with CPT-MV investors
Opposite to the previous case, we now assume I = 0 and H > 0 to have a market populated by solely CPT-MV traders. As we have just seen in Section 3.1, the MV criterion is not a sucient condition for the existence of CAPM equilibria. The parameters that describe the preferences of our CPT-MV investors are as in Lemma 1, (iii). To
agent H is the less loss adverse of the pool; intuitively, she is the trader mostly inclined in bearing risk. We now show that if λ H is strictly greater than a certain thresholdλ, then the optimal demand for the risky security is zero for every trader, no matter how close to zero the price q 1 is. Thus, an equilibrium with positive prices does not exist.
Formally, the Linear LA specication in equation (9) gives
which is linear in Θ h M , strictly decreasing in λ h and q M (recall that µ M − R f q M ≥ 0). Therefore, it suces to check that for q M = 0 7 , the term inside the brackets is negative for the H-th trader.
Computing the integrals in equation (16), we see that this is indeed true as long as
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal r.v.. We remark that the thresholdλ does not depend on R f ; using the relation µ M /σ M = µ 1 /σ 1 , we see thatλ is increasing in µ 1 and decreasing in σ 1 . Finally, if one considers the index of riskiness α := µ 1 /σ 1 , thenλ is increasing in α as expected. 
7 If we use returns in our computations, then q M = 0 does not make sense. However, one could perform a limit for q M ↓ 0 thanks to the continuity of v h .
whereR M = R M − R f is the market portfolio excess return and P is the cdf of ∆X h . Unfortunately, equation (18) is misleading when looking for an equilibrium because it can lead to equilibria with negative prices.
We focus on this issue in a simple market as illustrated in Example 1. The only price to be determined is the market price q M , or equivalently q 1 . Starting from equation (9), we can perform integration by parts as explained in Barberis and Huang (2008) , Lemma 1, and we obtain
Equation (19) gives the optimal solution to the portfolio optimization problem:
Consequently, an equilibrium exists if and only if f vanishes at someq M > 0. Note that f is a continuous, monotone decreasing function and lim
Hence, it always exists a unique solutionq M ∈ R of equation (20) . Ifq M > 0, then it will be the equilibrium price and the equilibrium allocations can be arbitrarily chosen as long as they satisfy H h=1Θ h M = 1. Substantially, we proved the following result. (3) and let f be dened as in equation (20) . If f (0) < 0 then there are no nancial equilibria.
Proposition 2 (No equilibrium with CPT-MV homogeneous CRRA agents). Assume I = 0 and H > 0 (only CPT-MV agents). Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold with homogeneous CPT-MV preferences as in equation
A closer look to equation (20) shows that it is very similar to equation (18) , but they are not the same. In fact, Barberis and Huang (2008) exploit the market portfolio return R M instead of the market portfolio price q M in order to nd an equilibrium. Their procedure is not correct because µ M and σ 2 M are exogenous, whereas q M must be determined endogenously. Therefore, even if one is able to nd a pair (
) that satises equation (18) , this does not mean that there exists a q M > 0 which solves equation (20) . In fact for any given µ M and σ M , the price q M inuences simultaneously the mean of the market return and its variance. (30)). After that, they specify the parameters as follows: (α, δ, λ, R f , σ M ) = (0.88, 0.65, 2.25, 1.02, 0.15). Inserting these values into equation (18) , they correctly state that V (R M ) = 0 if µ M = 0.075 (that is to say, a gross expected return equal to 1.095). However, they do not exhibit a specic level of the market price q M nor they specify the exogenous supplies S and the payos D.
On the contrary, the rst step of the appropriate procedure which leads to the equilibrium price q M > 0 (if it exists) consists in xing S 1 , µ 1 and σ 1 . Second, using equation (13) we can compute µ M and σ M and nally we can look for a solution to equation (20) . As an example, we can select S 1 and µ 1 such that µ M = 1.095. Leaving unchanged the other parameters, that is (α, δ, λ, R f ) = (0.88, 0.65, 2.25, 1.02), we can plot f (q M ) for dierent values of σ M (see Figure 2) . The results are quite clear; an equilibrium exists as long as σ M lies in a suitable range (numerical simulations show σ M ∈ (0, 2.19)). On the contrary, for some specications there is not a strictly positive solution to f (q M ) = 0. In other words, no market price can sustain an equilibrium. A similar situation arises if we change the values of some preference parameters. In a numerical analysis, we xed (α, δ, R f , µ M , σ M ) = (0.88, 0.65, 1.02, 1.095, 1.75) and allowed λ to vary. Results are shown in Figure  3 ; in this case we can nd an equilibrium only if λ ∈ (1, 2.77). Now, we extend the previous analysis to more general specications of the CPT-MV preferences.
First of all, note that homogeneity is an extremely strong assumption. Allowing heterogeneity into the pool of CPT-MV traders makes our scenario a more realistic one, though it does not exclude absence of equilibria. In fact, consider a group of investors whose preferences fulll all the requirements of (3) (with appropriate choices of λ h and δ h as explained in Section 2). For σ M > 0, dene the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio as
Observe that the bounds on q M imply ξ ∈ [0,
). Now we use equation (22) 
assuming that the previous integrals exist. Our equation (24) is the analogous to equation no. (12) in De Giorgi, Hens and Levy (2011) 8 . In their Lemma 2, the authors correctly prove that choosing w h − as in (3), F h is continuous, strictly increasing on R + and F h (0) < 0. Moreover, they show that lim ξ↑+∞ F h (ξ) = +∞ and they use this argument to prove the existence of an equilibrium in their Proposition 6. Unfortunately, if we look for equilibria with strictly positive prices, performing the limit for ξ ↑ +∞ does not make any sense (recall the upper bound on ξ). More properly, an equilibrium can exist if we ndξ ∈ [0,
. , H and F h (ξ) = 0 for at least one h .
Obviously, one can compute backq M usingξ and equation (22) . We remark that (25) be dened as in equation (24) . If there is a nancial equilibrium, then there exists aξ ∈ [0,
) such that (25) holds.
As De Giorgi, Hens and Levy (2011) note, in this case the attainable equilibria are not economically meaningful. If condition (25) holds, it is usually satised for exactly one h . That is to say, due to heterogeneity of the traders' preferences it is extremely unlikely to nd aξ such that F h (ξ) = F h (ξ) = 0 for distinct h and h . Thus, the resulting equilibrium implies optimal null risky investment for all agents but one and this last investor clears the security market optimally acquiring the whole market portfolio. Actually, this agent is indierent with respect to its nancial position as equation (23) shows.
We now leave aside the CRRA case which causes such a highly unrealistic scenario and we focus on the piecewise-exponential utility index introduced in (6) . The advantage of this specication stands in its asymptotic behavior. Ignoring the eect of the probability distortions, we see that reaching an innite gain implies u h (x) → λ h,+ , whereas unbounded losses causes u h (x) → λ h,− .
Being λ h,− > λ h,+ > 0, these investors will avoid extreme leverage or short-selling and the optimal proportion Θ h M will be zero or a nite amount. To be more precise, in this case we have
Considering the Sharpe ratio ξ ∈ [0,
) as a parameter, we dene the optimal demand function dened as in (6) . If there is a nancial equilibrium, then there existsξ ∈ [0, Finally, note that (28) can not be formulated using the weak inequality (≥). In fact, suppose Θ h M are strictly monotone increasing and
must be refused as it implies q M = 0.
In any case,ξ will induce the equilibrium market price through (22) and Θ h M (ξ) will be the equilibrium allocations. In the presence of N risky securities one has to check that the N prices are strictly positive. This can be done usingq M and N − 1 non-redundant equations from (10).
Markets with both types of investors
Mixing the results of the previous analysis we can study more realistic markets where the two pools of traders interact. So far, we have seen that a CARA EU agent is willing to acquire risky securities and her optimal demand is a decreasing function of the market price (see equation (14)). This behavior is generally shared by the CPT-MV investors; however, the particular shape of the utility function u h can cause serious troubles leading to unbounded optimal positions. This feature lowers the chances of having an equilibrium and it heavily restricts the type of attainable equilibria. Loosely speaking,
we could distinguish between well-behaved traders (whose demand for the stocks is bounded, e.g.
CARA EU and piecewise-exponential CPT-MV investors) and ill-behaved traders (whose demand is
potentially unbounded, e.g. Linear LA and piecewise-power CPT-MV investors).
When all agents are well-behaved we are able to provide sucient conditions for the existence of a positive market price q M , which is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium in a market with one risky asset. In this last case, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 (Sucient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium). Assume I > 0 and H > 0 (both types of agents). Let Assumptions 1-5 hold with CPT-MV heterogeneous preferences as in Lemma 1, (ii), with u h dened as in (6) . Each of the following conditions implies the existence of an equilibrium:
Proof. First recall that for a CARA EU agent the optimal demand Θ i M is given by (14) , which can be written as
ξ. Summation over i yields an aggregate demand by the EU traders, equal to 1 Λσ M ξ. Now, the presence of both types of investors implies the following market clearing condition:
Note that the left-hand side of the previous equality is a continuous function of ξ which converges to zero as ξ ↓ 0. (ii), where the strict inequality is justied as in the proof of Proposition 4.
The intuition behind the previous result is straightforward. If (i) holds, the presence of EU CARA agents is sucient to assure the existence of an equilibrium independently on the presence of a group of well-behaved CPT-MV investors. In any case, the pool H is helpful in reaching an equilibrium when (i) is not fullled since CPT-MV traders can contribute to clear the risky market.
At this point, adding ill-behaved agents potentially damages our results. Even the presence of a unique ill-behaved agent could be extremely dangerous, as long as her optimal policy is to exploit innite leverage on some securities. On the contrary, if such an ill-behaved trader stays out of the stock market, then her impact on the equilibrium prices becomes irrelevant 10 . We are going to exploit this idea in a moment.
Market segmentation
In this section, we still assume the presence of agents from both pools. Let us restrict our attention to a particular class of equilibria, namely segmented equilibria. The occurrence of market segmentation is not new to the literature (see Merton (1987) and Sharpe (1991) among others). Segmented-market versions of the CAPM are usually obtained imposing external constraints on the investment opportunity set. On the contrary, we aim at studying equilibria where segmentation arises endogenously in the model.
From now on we assume the presence of a single risky asset, i.e. Assumption 1 holds with N = 1. We recall that this risky security has a per-share payo D 1 ∼ N (µ 1 , σ 2 1 ) and its exogenous supply is S 1 > 0. For the sake of clarity, we prefer to work with primary variables without using the market portfolio.
Denition 2 (Segmented equilibrium). A segmented equilibrium consists of a strictly positive pricē q 1 ∈ R + and allocationsθ j ∈ R, j ∈ I ∪ H, such that
(ii) (Market clearing) givenq 1 ,
Loosely speaking, a segmented equilibrium is a market equilibrium where for the CPT-MV agents it is optimal a totally risk-less investment. Therefore, the market clearing condition is satised through the aggregate demand of the EU traders. The reason for such a denition is to model an hypothetical economy whose agents can be divided into two groups, namely risky market participants and non-participants 11 . Thus, endogenously reaching a segmented equilibrium could explain high non-participation levels in the stock market as long as CPT-MV agents form the prevailing pool (see Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) , Bertaut (1998) and Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) ).
Before giving formal results, note that the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio that involves the single risky security can be computed as
It follows that in equilibrium we necessarily have ξ 1 ∈ [0, µ1 σ1 ). Recall that in the presence of exclusively CARA EU agents there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive prices if and only if Λ < µ1 σ 2 1 S1
. Moreover, the equilibrium Sharpe ratio will beξ 1 = Λσ 1 S 1 , as we can deduce from (15).
10 In the case of indierence with respect to her risky position, an ill-behaved trader could clear the market by acquiring the risky securities that the other participants are not willing to purchase. For example, this would make sense in a stock-exchange placing where unsold securities are bought by a single institution. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a portfolio manager or a household who is indierent in bearing undened risks. We will not deepen on this type of equilibria.
11 We could use a more general notion of segmented equilibrium where the group of participants coincide with that of well-behaved traders and the group of non-participants contains the ill-behaved traders. Unfortunately, it would prevent from obtaining explicit expressions in our results.
For the CPT-MV investors, we can exploit ξ 1 to write down an equivalent expression for v h . In fact, we have (31) assuming that the previous integrals exist. Now, the denition of segmented equilibrium implies
In particular, if θ h 1 = 0 is not the unique maximum point for v h (·,ξ 1 ), we can impose the equilibrium allocationθ h 1 = 0. Therefore, the last step to prove the existence of segmented equilibria is to nd conditions that imply (32).
Lemma 4 (Sucient conditions for (32)). For the h-th trader, each of the following conditions implies (32) :
(i) (Linear LA) preferences are as in Lemma 1, (iii), with
(ii) (Piecewise-power utility) preferences are as in Lemma 1, (ii), with f
where F h is dened in (25) .
Proof. To prove (i) we follow the lines of Example 1. Adapting (16) with the parameters µ 1 , σ 1 and using the variables (θ h 1 , ξ 1 ), we can perform integration and obtain (33) .
For (ii), it suces to adapt (23) and (24) with the variables (θ h 1 , ξ 1 ) and note that the homogeneity in θ h 1 is preserved.
We incidentally observe thatλ does not depend on R f and µ 1 , nor on S 1 . Computing the rstorder derivatives, we see thatλ is increasing in both Λ and σ 1 . Now, Λ grows when there are less CARA EU traders (more generally, when a CARA coecient increases). In such a situation, the aggregate demand of the pool I remains the same since it must clear the market, whereas the candidate equilibrium priceq 1 falls. This in turn attracts stock purchases and a CPT-MV agent stays out of the security market only if she has a higher loss-aversion coecient. On the other hand, a rise in σ 1 means greater variance, which should in turn discourage risky investment. However, (33) imposes a stricter bound on the loss-aversion coecient and this fact in counterintuitive. Finally, we note that an analytic (but not explicit) expression could be given for the well-behaved piecewise-exponential utility traders using (26) , but it is not useful for our purposes.
Using the preceding lemma, we have the main result of this section. . Suppose that the preferences of each CPT-MV investor satisfy one of the conditions (i) or (ii) of Lemma 4. Then there exists a segmented equilibrium withq 1 =
Proof. The proposed equilibrium is the one attained when the market is populated by only CARA EU investors. Given such aq 1 , we computeξ 1 through (30) and check that it implies null risky investment for every CPT-MV agent. But thanks to Lemma 4, condition (32) holds for all h ∈ H and we conclude.
5
Segmented equilibrium with endogenous risk-free return A deep analysis of the market segmentation model introduced in the preceding section reveals a drawback. Suppose for a moment that the pool I of stock market participants is endowed with an extremely small percentage of the overall wealth of the economy, whereas the remaining wealth is shared among the members in H. If a segmented equilibrium is attained, the price of the risky security (and its return) is exclusively determined by the joint eect of market parameters and EU agents' preferences (see the statement of Proposition 6). At the same time, the huge amount of money owned by the CPT-MV investors is totally conveyed in the risk-less asset market without aecting the risk-free return R f . Not only, R f acts negatively (positively) on the equilibrium price (expected return), but as long as R f is exogenously given,q 1 andR 1 are not inuenced. Instead, a more realistic scenario has to take into account the eect of massive risk-less investment. In particular, R f should decrease (increase) as money ows into (out of ) the risk-free market.
We proceed to add this intuition to our model. Firstly, we remove Assumptions 1 and 2 and we replace it with the new hypothesis:
Assumption 6 (Market structure). There are 2 traded assets in a frictionless market without constraints.
-Asset 0 is the risk-free asset whose unit payo is µ 0 units of currency in every state of the world. Its exogenous supply is S 0 > 0.
-Asset 1 is the risky security whose per-share payo is
). Its exogenous supply is
Assumption 7 (Investor endowments). Each investor receives an initial wealth
in units of currency.
Observe that the risk-less asset is no more in elastic supply, as it happens in actual Government or corporate bond markets. Moreover, for convenience we can think of W j as the savings amount of the j-th agent that must be divided among risky and risk-less investment.
We recover the notation from the previous sections: q = (q 0 , q 1 ) is the price vector, where also q 0 must be determined endogenously. Consequently, the expected return R 0 = µ 0 /q 0 is endogenous as well as R 1 = µ 1 /q 1 . We restrict our attention to segmented equilibria.
Denition 3 (Segmented equilibrium with endogenous risk-free return). A segmented equilibrium is a vector of strictly positive pricesq = (q 0 ,q 1 ) ∈ R 2 ++ and allocationsθ j ∈ R, j ∈ I ∪ H, such that (i) (Portfolio optimization) givenq,θ j ∈ arg max
We immediately observe that the standard market clearing condition (ii) can be written in a more intuitive way. Recall the budget constraints, namely
and denote
the total initial wealths of the two pools and the aggregate wealth of the economy respectively. Summing the budget constraints over i ∈ I and h ∈ H and using the segmented equilibrium condition θ h 1 = 0, h ∈ H, we obtain the equivalent market clearing condition
The rst equation in (34) is nothing but the budget constraint of the economy, whereas the second equation means that EU agents clear the market for the risky asset. Looking for equilibria, we can carefully go through our analysis replacing R f (or 1 + r) with the risk-less return R 0 ; however, this time q 0 must be treated as a variable. An important thing to note is that the reference points RP h of our CPT-MV traders are no more well dened. So far, we xed RP h = W h R f , and this was sensible as long as R f was an exogenous parameter. From now on, we set RP h = W h R 0 as the endogenous reference point. As noted in Köszegi and Rabin (2006) , a good reason for an endogenous RP is that the economy itself can determine the RPs through the achievement of personal equilibria.
In particular, the RP can be seen as a rational expectation about outcomes that must be consistent with optimizing behavior, given that expectation. In our world, the RP becomes the risk-free return adjusted initial wealth, given that return. Note that R 0 will be the result of the optimal choices by every agent. Therefore, in our model the RP s will be determined by the whole economy in a general equilibrium. In the next proposition we characterize a segmented equilibrium and we provide sucient conditions for its existence.
Proposition 7 (Segmented equilibrium with endogenous risk-free return). Let Assumptions 3-7 hold. (i) (Necessary condition) If a segmented equilibrium exists, then the equilibrium prices arē
and the equilibrium allocation arē
and the preferences of each CPT-MV investor satisfy one of the conditions (i) or (ii) of Lemma 4, then an equilibrium exists (and it is characterized by (35) and (36)). Proof. For (i), having assumed EU CARA traders we know that utility maximization implies
Summing over i ∈ I to satisfy the market clearing condition (34), we see that in equilibrium it necessarily holdsq
Solving the linear system
yields the equilibrium prices. Finally, equilibrium allocation can be obtained via (37) and the personal budget constraints. For (ii), it suces to adapt the proof of Proposition 6.
Thanks to (35) we can compute the expected equilibrium returns:
Note that if an equilibrium exists, thenR 1 >R 0 , since µ 1 > ν 1 12 . Moreover,
In other words, the risk-free interest rate is positive if and only if the overall expected payo of the market (µ 0 S 0 + µ 1 S 1 ) corrected by the product between the market price of risk Λ and the total variance of the market (σ 1 S 1 )
2 is greater than the aggregate savings of the economy. Hence, we can not a priori exclude the existence of equilibria with negative risk-less interest rate. For the CPT-MV investors,R 0 < 1 implies a RP lower than the initial wealth. This amounts to say that these agents expect (and actually realize) a decrease of their savings 13 .
Now we perform a comparative statics analysis. Computing rst-order derivatives, we nd the next result (for convenience we suppressed the bar superscript).
12 We are not able to say much more about the equity premiumR 1 −R 0 . In any case, our equilibria can sustain the empirically observed equity premium puzzle; see Mehra and Prescott (1985) . Corollary 1 (Comparative statics on equilibrium returns). The following relations hold:
Observe that we are not able to assess the sign of certain derivatives as they depend on mixtures of the model's parameters. In any case, the preceding inequalities generally conrm economic intuition.
It is worthwhile saying that an increase in one investor's wealth produces a fall in both expected returns, no matter which pool the trader comes from. Not only, R 1 is always more aected than R 0 and this is an unpleasant prediction of this model. In fact, we would expect that raising W H causes a greater drop in R 0 than in R 1 . The source of this aw lies in the CARA hypotheses over EU agents.
As it appears clear from equation (37), the optimal demand of EU traders does not depend on the wealth W i . The same is true for the relation (38) between q 0 and q 1 that must hold in equilibrium.
Consequently, the equilibrium prices (35) The previous equation implicitly denes a function q 1 (q 0 ) which describes a locus of candidate equilibrium price vectors. Generally, it will be a regular curve on the (q 0 , q 1 ) plane and using the implicit function theorem we get
.
Suppose the signs of the partial derivatives of η i are those we assumed before. In such case, we see that if q 1 (q 0 ) intersects the economy budget constraint, then it necessarily produces an upward crossing. The (possible) intersection points yield equilibrium price vectors, though they will be generally dierent from the one described in Proposition 7 (see the curve c in Figure 4 and the relative equilibriumq ). On the other hand, we can not assure the existence of a crossing point.
This last situation is represented by the curve c in Figure 4 . Not surprisingly, the derivatives of η i can have dierent signs with respect to the aforementioned case; see Ingersoll (1987) . Therefore, it remains an open question whether equilibria exist and how they can be found.
Suppose instead to remove Assumption 7 on the exogenous endowments and restore Assumption 5 concerning CARA EU agents. Analytically, this means that (38) holds while the economy budget constraint becomes a redundant equation. A look at Figure 4 shows that we have an entire line of equilibria since each point on s can sustain an equilibrium. The problem now consists in nding the equilibrium that will be attained. At rst, we can put some natural bounds onq 0 . It seems sensible to choose q 0 ≤ µ 0 in order to have an equilibrium with positive risk-free interest rate. Then, we could suppose that the issuer of the risk-less asset only accepts to place its securities at a suciently high price, i.e. q 0 ≥q 0 for someq 0 > 0 14 . The set of equilibria is therefore reduced to the segment AA in Figure 4 . It is also clear that for the CPT-MV agents there is indierence since once a segmented equilibrium is reached, we have v h (X h ) = 0 no matter which equilibrium is selected. In conclusion, the equilibrium pair (q 0 ,q 1 ) depends on the market power of the participants. If EU traders are the prevailing force, then the attained equilibrium will be close to (q 0 , ν1 µ0q 0 ), located at A in Figure  4 . In fact, for any pair (q 0 , q 1 ) satisfying (38), we have
which is monotone decreasing in q 0 and reaches its maximum for q 0 =q 0 . On the contrary, as the power of the bond issuer increases, the equilibrium will move toward (µ 0 , ν 1 ), i.e. the point A in 
Conclusions
Including heterogeneous agents in nancial market models adds realism to the description of actual economies. At the same time, research of equilibria becomes more sophisticated and (strong) assumptions are needed to retain analytical tractability. Even in an extremely simple setting of one risk-free and one risky asset, the existence of an equilibrium with positive asset prices is not guaranteed. This drawback was already known in the presence of solely expected utility maximizers and it equally arises with non-expected utility paradigms.
Assuming expected utility and cumulative prospect theory preferences, we nd that the classical CAPM provides a necessary basis for heterogeneous agents models as well as it happened in homogeneously populated economies. Depending on the particular choices of the utility functions, it is possible to give necessary and/or sucient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Focusing on segmented equilibria, we provide an intuitive explanation for the high non-participation levels of households in the stock markets, as widely documented in advanced economies.
Furthermore, we leave a number of open questions for future research. First, we wish to nd conditions that assure equilibria with positive prices when there is more than one risky security.
Second, we have seen that removing the constant absolute risk aversion hypothesis over the pool of expected utility maximizers strongly involves the model; in particular, an equilibrium needs not to exist or there can be plenty of equilibria. At last, we aim at introducing some selection criteria when more than one equilibrium is attainable.
14 We can think to the issuer as a rm that places its bonds with a bid auction where the initial price is set toq 0 .
